Forthcoming consultation on the Firearms Act

As you will likely be aware, the Home Office, at the Home Secretary's behest, is due to launch a consultation on firearm licensing, likely in the first half of 2026.  No one, apart from policy officials, has certain knowledge of what will be included in the consultation; however, it is being launched due to the recommendations contained in the Coroner’s report and the IOPC reports in respect of the Keyham tragedy and a report by the Scottish Affairs committee on firearms licensing after a murder on Skye.

First and foremost, we should never forget the victims in these two tragedies, people with families, loved ones and friends who have suffered immense loss.  Imagine how you would feel if you suffered the same loss.  It is an unbearable thought that others will have to shoulder forever.  They are simply tragedies and there are no other words.

The reports from Keyham generally concluded that the gunman, who held a shotgun certificate, should never have had a shotgun. The report was damning in its criticism of Devon and Cornwall police, who patently failed in their core duty to ensure public safety. The Home Office and the National Police Chiefs Council also received significant criticism.  All of it was warranted and beyond.  As is usual, though, it was a race to see who could be blamed at the bottom.  Did senior managers responsible for the allocation of resources and oversight stand up and say, ‘This was my fault.  I failed in my duty as a manager.  I am not fit to bear the responsibility of management.  I should resign.’  If anyone did, it would be refreshing to hear.  The force in question, Devon and Cornwall, despite our request under the Freedom of Information Act, declined to share the Chief Constable's briefing material.  What have they got to hide?

In respect of the Skye matter, a man has been convicted of murder and other serious crimes, and the circumstances were widely reported by the Scottish Press.  However, the Police Investigation Review Commissioner (PIRC) has still to make its findings public. A Fatal Accident Inquiry may be heard in due course.  That is a decision for the Crown.  In essence, we are unsighted as to whether anything could have been done to stop this man from getting a lawfully held shotgun.  We simply don’t know.

To remind ourselves at this juncture, this is why the consultation is occurring: to address the learning points from the two incidents above.

The Home Office guidance, both statutory and non-statutory, has been or is being revised.  The statutory guidance was published in September 2025 and was heralded as reinforcing the public safety narrative, albeit when we looked at it, the question was why aren’t the police doing this anyway?

All is well and good then.  Devon and Cornwall tell us that lessons have been learned, and they will change.  The Home Office and the NPCC say that lessons have been learned and they will change.  The new guidance, which Chief Constables must have regard to, is published.  All is well with the world, and we are also going to hammer the certificate holders with legislative changes.  Life is grand.

However…

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Policing and Fire and Rescue Services are carrying out a thematic inspection of firearms licensing in England and Wales.  We have been interviewed, as have at least one other shooting organisation. It was refreshing to speak with Inspectors who appeared to have their ears wide open.

Our view was that the greatest risk to public safety in respect of firearms licensing was the police, due to inefficiency, poor practice, under-resourcing, overwork, etc.  The system needs a root-and-branch review with a drive towards a national process.  This has been our stated position for many years.  Scotland did it, and it would be straightforward for the E&W police to do it if there was the drive and will (which there isn’t).

Despite all the shooting organisations highlighting their concerns, the view from officialdom has been generally, nothing to see here. All is well.

Yet we all knew it wasn’t, and lo and behold, the Inspectors walk into Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire (BCH) and are so shocked by what they find that they issue an accelerated cause for concern notice almost immediately.

They stated:

In our inspections, if we identify a more serious, critical or systemic shortcoming in a force or service’s practice, policy or performance, we will report it as a cause of concern. A cause of concern will always be accompanied by one or more recommendations. When we identify causes of concern during our inspections, we normally provide details in the subsequent inspection report.

In some cases, such as where we discover significant service failures or risks to public safety, we can report our concerns and recommendations earlier. This is called an accelerated cause of concern.

We have issued the following accelerated cause of concern to Bedfordshire Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary and Hertfordshire Constabulary because the tri-force collaboration doesn’t adequately manage its firearms and explosives licensing arrangements to keep the public safe.

The Inspectors thereafter detailed what they found.

Cause of concern

The tri-force collaboration doesn’t effectively and efficiently manage its firearms and explosives licensing arrangements to keep the public safe

In our inspection we found that the collaboration had significant backlogs in processing its firearms and shotgun licence applications and renewals. We identified some cases that had been outstanding for up to two years. The collaboration doesn’t have enough officers and staff to address the volume of outstanding applications. We found that it was issuing a large number of temporary permits as a result (over 1,000). As the collaboration must review temporary permits every six months, this delays and duplicates work.

The collaboration also doesn’t have an effective case management system to manage applications and there is limited supervision of case files. It doesn’t provide enough firearms licensing training to the firearms and explosive licensing unit and other related departments to make sure officers and staff have the required skills to do their jobs effectively.

We found that it wasn’t complying with certification requirements for licensing certificates. It was signing off certificates without proper delegated authority (someone with assigned responsibility and accountability for firearms licensing). There was no standard operating procedure for seizing and revoking firearms licences across the collaboration, which was creating inconsistency.

The collaboration’s renewal policy for shotgun licences may leave the public at risk. The shotgun renewal policy is a ‘desk-based process’, and the collaboration carries out checks remotely. It doesn’t carry out home visits or household checks to identify any factors that could suggest the applicant isn’t suitable to have a licence. It doesn’t directly speak to the licence holder, other people living with them or the referees listed on their renewal application.

Poor communication, both internally and externally, was creating inefficiencies. At the time of our inspection, there was no phone number to allow the public to receive a prompt response from their firearms and explosive licensing unit. And we identified 2,190 unanswered emails awaiting the collaboration’s attention. The risk that might be contained within these emails was unknown. It had no plan to deal with this backlog and stay on top of email demand.

We also found that officers and staff in the unit were often unclear about their roles and responsibilities. The collaboration didn’t make them aware of the work they were authorised to carry out. This inconsistency led to confusion and duplicated efforts.

Although the collaboration had introduced new senior leaders and governance structures, at the time of our inspection, these changes hadn’t yet addressed the issues we identified.

Recommendations

With immediate effect, the collaboration should:

·        make sure that all licensing certificates are signed off with proper delegated authority;

·        update its firearms licensing policy and standard operating procedures, including delegated authorities, in line with August 2025 statutory guidance to create consistency across all three forces;

·        understand the risks that the backlog poses and appropriately prioritise licence applications and renewals;

·        review and assure itself that its desk-based shotgun licence renewal process effectively reduces risk to the public;

·        put in place a governance structure with oversight from senior leaders to make sure the firearms and explosives licensing department functions effectively; and

·        improve how it communicates with its officers and staff and the public.

Within three months, the collaboration should:

·        provide enough, sustainable resources to safely manage the workload in the firearms and explosive licensing unit; and

·        make sure that all officers and staff have the right skills, training and experience to do their jobs effectively.

FUBAR! What a surprise!  The concerns in BCH have been known for a long time.  But it was fine, the new guidance was issued, the consultation was due – nothing to see here.  Except there was something to see.  And the real question is, amongst the Force Executives, is anyone saying within these hallowed corridors ‘‘this was my fault.  I failed in my duty as a manager.  I am not fit to bear the responsibility of management.  I exposed the public to danger.  I should resign.’  I doubt it.

In September 2024, Nicholas Prosper killed three of his family members in their home in Luton, Bedfordshire.  He did not hold a shotgun certificate.

The tragedy in Bedfordshire was documented in two episodes of 24 Hours in police custody.  This documented the murder investigation, from the bravery of the first responders at the flat door, to sights that will never leave them when they discovered the bodies of a mum and her two children who had been shot with a shotgun.  As the investigation progressed, the human cost was exposed in its brutality.  All too human emotions were revealed by the investigators, who are only flesh and blood themselves and have to deal with such events that leave such atrocious memories.  It is a powerful watch, and the police officers, at all stages, should be commended for their conduct.

In the documentary, the process of how the murderer obtained his shotgun was examined.  He had forged a shotgun certificate and had duped a responsible, law-abiding certificate holder to sell the gun to him.

A member of the Force Executive, the now Deputy Chief Constable, was briefed on the circumstances, and he questioned the process.  Perhaps it did indeed need questioning.  However, what did he do next?  Did he make enquiries with his firearms licensing branch to ensure that they were delivering a robust service?  It’s his job, as the Deputy Chief Constable, to ensure that the service being provided by the police is of a sufficient standard.  Did he fail in his duty, or was it somebody else’s fault?  Was he professionally curious enough, and what exactly did he do to reduce the risk?  Perhaps a full explanation of why the Force finds itself in such a position should be posted on the Force's website, replacing the patronisingly laughable YouTube update posted by an Assistant Chief Constable some time ago.  The Deputy Chief Constable is no stranger to the cameras.

Some forces can deliver a service of exceedingly high standards.  Other’s cant.  Are BCH the worst?  One of the worst, yes, but other poor performers spring to mind.

To pile the ironies on is that Bedfordshire Police and Crime Commissioner John Tizard, after the tragedy committed by Nicholas Proper, said in  March 2025,

Whilst Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire constabularies are taking measures to help legitimate firearms holders spot potentially fraudulent licences and be cautious about sales, there is an urgent need for legislative change.

“The public rightly would expect stringent and effective safeguards to be in place to better regulate the issuing of licences, and gun sales and exchanges, particularly when the vendor is a private individual, in order to keep us all safe.”

You’d better believe it, Mr. Tizard. The public would rightly expect stringent and effective safeguards to be in place to better regulate the issuance of licences.  And yet he was sitting on a ticking bomb, which then poses questions.  Did he know about it?  If he didn’t, why not?  Was it hidden from him?  If so, by whom?  Surely, there must be a need for an enquiry into the ignorance.  He has a statutory duty to hold the Chief Constable to account.

All in all, this is a sad state of affairs, which required very unusual action.  We will await the outcome.

We are all aware that the fees for firearms licensing increased to cover full cost recovery.  Should anyone in command of BCH read this post, I would ask them to reflect on this.  Paragraph 8.7 of the Public Inquiry into the Shootings at Dunblane Primary School on 13 March 1996 (Cullen) states;

In the report made by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary for England and Wales on the Administration of Firearms Licensing in 1993, it was said that it was essential that shooters receive a quality service and value for money.  It is no doubt appropriate that efficiency should be the aim, but it should not obtain the upper hand over the primary purpose of the system, which is the protection and safety of the public.’

You have the money from full cost recovery.  You have been found to be posing a danger to public safety.  Not a penny recovered from fees should be spent elsewhere, no matter what the demand.  A properly resourced firearms licensing function is required, and the fees should be spent on providing a service to certificate holders, thereby ensuring that only those who are suitable to access firearms are allowed to do so.

And one last question.  Can you please let us know, at what rank does responsibility stop?